This paper aims to evidence the meaning of “ontology of present”, a concept elaborated by Michel Foucault, and intends to elucidate the philosopher’s idea that subjectivity is historically formed. The context of the concept’s emergence will be analyzed, considering Foucault’s studies on the ancient greco-roman moral, in which he discuss the role of liberty and autonomy in the development of citizens. To the philosopher, the ontology of present consists in a critic of the domination and subjugation mechanisms, produced by disciplinary (...) and control societies. With this critic, Foucault pictures theoric tools to analyze the actuality, making possible to transform the historical processes of subjectification. Keywords: ontology of the present; subjectivity; history; Michel Foucault; actuality. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...) neither straightforward nor consistent, and are complicated by commercial interests and tensions around compulsive overuse. This multi-layered reality requires an analysis that is itself multidimensional and that takes into account human experience at various levels of resolution. We borrow from HCI and psychological research to apply a model (“METUX”) that identifies six distinct spheres of technology experience. We demonstrate the value of the model for understanding human autonomy in a technology ethics context at multiple levels by applying it to the real-world case study of an AI-enhanced video recommender system. In the process we argue for the following three claims: 1) There are autonomy-related consequences to algorithms representing the interests of third parties, and they are not impartial and rational extensions of the self, as is often perceived; 2) Designing for autonomy is an ethical imperative critical to the future design of responsible AI; and 3) Autonomy-support must be analysed from at least six spheres of experience in order to approriately capture contradictory and downstream effects. (shrink)

A similar framing of inarticulable formations, of pure multiplicities, marks the respective projects of Deleuze and Laplanche. The absolute exteriority of a disjunctive multiplicity is re-inscribed as a relativised, interiorised trace. This trace-logic of Deleuze and Laplanche has definitive implications where the psychoanalytic subject and the unconscious is concerned. However, there is a difficulty in this logic of accounting for the unconscious formations enumerated by Freud (slips of the tongue, jokes, symptoms etc.). In turning to Lacan, however, the positions of (...) Deleuze and Laplanche can be illuminated (despite their attempt to ‘move beyond’ him). We see the trace in its material, unconscious substantiality upheld by the function of the big Other as an absent centre to which discourse is referred and through which the speaking subject is revealed as being in a discrepant relation to itself. The big Other, in his function as intimate, yet lacking, alterity, seems to help to resolve the problematic of multiplicity for Deleuze and Laplanche. (shrink)

In this paper two systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision are overviewed, both defined over Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) due to the possibility of defining a formal consistency operator within these logics. The AGM° system is strongly based on this operator and internalize the notion of formal consistency in the explicit constructions and postulates. Alternatively, the AGMp system uses the AGM-compliance of LFIs and thus assumes a wider notion of paraconsistency - not necessarily related to the notion of formal (...) consistency. (shrink)

A strange dialectical reversal characterizes the oppositions which psychoanalysis posits against philosophy and neuroscience: what psychoanalysis intervenes with as a unique and missing quality of these subjects, reveals itself upon enquiry as already having been a feature of said subjects. This article first discusses the failed intervention of psychoanalysis within the perceived totalities and absolutes of German idealism. Psychoanalysis, founded on an ontological division and internal inconsistency with a retroactive logic, finds this internal contradiction already reflected within the supposed totalities (...) of Schelling and Hegel. Schelling’s “blind act,” a decision with no prior foundation that grounds an abstract identity-in-itself, appears as the counterpart to what Badiou calls the strictly “analytic act.” Hegel’s Science of Logic, in which the inconclusive interpenetration of being and nothing presupposes its own conclusion in the transitions to essence, and in which an internal incompleteness and contradiction are retroactively constitutive of the concept, similarly nullifies the intervention of psychoanalysis. Finally, precisely such a reversal is presented in neuroscience, where the constitutive contradiction of contingently functional neuronal formations in the adaptive “multiple demand” model of executive functioning repeats the contingent and self-contradicting psychoanalytic subject as being its own deference within linguistic, discursive formations. (shrink)

Na era das tecnologias digitais, entender vieses algorítmicos por meio das teorias da verdade ajuda a fazer perguntas cujas respostas facilitam a filtragem da informação de forma mais eficaz. O ganho é a compreensão aprofundada da realidade.

This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) (...) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” is published, along with some comments. (shrink)

The anthropologist James Frazer investigates the ritual gesture in search of be- liefs about the physical world by the native. Wittgenstein considers this a case of aspect- blindness, one that is disruptive of the conditions for understanding the native’s most triv- ial gestures. Unable to cast his glance from within the native situation, this methodological view from nowhere has an arresting effect on experience – in particular, the experience of speaking. This interruption is to be examined by means of a (...) thought experiment. Then, through the interplay of the concepts of Spirit and Aspect, a philosophical tool is described to assess the problem that can also serve as practical guide back to ordinary experience. The next step is to examine this way out in a particularly sensitive kind of experience of meaning: the aesthetic experience, also seen as a ritual. We conclude by alluding to a pos- sibly mutual illumination between aesthetic experience, translation studies and a Cavellian take on ordinary language. (shrink)

This article proposes a general strategy to overcome normative conflicts, namely, paradoxes represented in Standard Deontic Logic. This solution is based on preference relations between norms that circumvent situations of conflict. Pragmatic justifications of the proposed method are also given.

A Revisão de Crenças estuda como agentes racionais mudam suas crenças ao receberem novas informações. O sistema AGM, trabalho mais influente desta área apresentado por Alchourrón, Gärdenfos e Makinson, postula critérios de racionalidade para os diferentes tipos de mudança de crenças e oferece construções explícitas para tais - a equivalência entre os postulados e operações é chamado de teroema da representação. Trabalhos recentes mostram como o paradigma AGM pode ser compatível com diferentes lógicas não-clássicas, o que é chamado de AGM-compatibilidade (...) - este é o caso da família de lógicas paraconsistentes que analisamos, as Lógicas da Inconsistência Formal (LFIs, da sigla em inglês). A despeito da AGM-compatibilidade, ao se partir de uma nova lógica sua racionalidade subjacente deve ser entendida e sua linguagem deve ser efetivamente usada. Propomos assim novas construções que de fato capturam a intuição presente na LFIs - é o que chamamos de sistema AGMo. Com isso, possibilitamos a estas lógicas uma nova interpretação, na esteira da epistemologia formal. Em uma abordagem alternativa, ao se partir da AGM-compatibilidade os resultados AGM podem ser diretamente aplicados às LFIs - o que chamamos de sistema AGMp. Em ambas abordagens, provamos os respectivos teoremas da representação sempre que necessário. (shrink)

Neste artigo propomos uma reconceitualização do amor como um modo de engajamento intersubjetivo normativamente guiado pela busca constante do equilíbrio entre a sub- e a sobredeterminação de seu objeto, que se efetiva em relações deconfiança marcadas pelo cuidado com o(a) outro(a). Esta reconceitualização permite que o amor participe da epistemologia como uma virtude intelectual responsabilista, que nos torna membros mais confiáveis de nossas comunidades epistêmicas e nos aproxima de descrições verdadeiras sobre o mundo, ao deixar que diversos pontos de vista (...) sobre esses objetos sejam reconhecidos e valorizados. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis is one of the notions undergoing dramatic changes during Wittgenstein's intermediate period. There's an aspect of such changes which might prove characteristic of the new directions taken by Wittgenstein's thought after 1929: it is the notion of complete analysis. We believe that Wittgenstein's treatment of this notion is also an interesting indication of new concerns generated by the "new method" itself, in terms of its radical openness to dialogism and its anti-dogmatism. Our aim here will be to explore (...) a couple of hints as to why this can be so. (shrink)

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual (...) operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations. (shrink)

A mudança da concepção do critério geral da significação que tinha Wittgenstein no seu período intermediário para a concepção dos critérios de significação do seu período posterior justifica que se fale numa correlativa mudança na aplicabilidade do conceito de ‘uso’. Acompanhar esta mudança é importante para se caracterizar o âmbito do pragmático tal como Wittgenstein o concebe, e bem assim o tipo de investigação sobre os fundamentos do simbolismo linguístico e sobre a ligação entre linguagem e mundo que esse filósofo (...) advoga como adequada. Este artigo pretende circunscrever algumas das novas questões que, no período intermediário de Wittgenstein , conduziriam a tal mudança conceptual. (shrink)

A doutrina do renascimento transmite a ideia de uma perspectiva temporal mais extensa, que abarca múltiplas vidas. Mas a medida em que o buddhismo chega à modernidade, outras interpretações começam a aparecer. Um exemplo é a interpretação psicológica de Ajahn Buddhadāsa, segundo a qual o termo “renascimento" se refere ao surgimento sucessivo da ideia do “eu" a cada instante de consciência. Esta interpretação diminui consideravelmente a extensão da perspectiva temporal ligada ao renascimento. Contra esta interpretação, Thānissaro Bhikkhu argumentou que uma (...) perspectiva temporal mais extensa é necessária para a compreensão de conceitos centrais do buddhismo como kamma ou dukkha. O objetivo principal deste artigo será investigar o papel da temporalidade na compreensão desses conceitos. Aliviando as preocupações de Thānissaro Bhikkhu, irei argumentar que uma perspectiva temporal mais restrita parece ser igualmente capaz de prover os elementos necessários para a compreensão profunda e completa dos principais ensinamentos buddhistas. (shrink)

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir que os ensinamentos Buddhistas sobreanattā(não-eu) não devem ser entendidos como uma negação categórica do eu, mas fazem parte de uma estratégia soteriológica comumente empregada pelo Buddha, de utilizar algo como ferramenta para o seu próprio fim. Tomando o kamma(ação) como o elemento central que estrutura todos os ensinamentos, podemos pensar na identificação do eu como um tipo de ação. Algumas instâncias desta ação serão hábeis e condutoras à libertação, e outras inábeis e condutoras ao (...) sofrimento. Com isso em mente, este artigo irá analisar algumas ações inábeis do eu e do não-eu em suttasselecionados do Cânone Pali, mostrando como se encaixam na estratégia do Buddha de se utilizar de elementos como ferramentas para o abandono desses próprios elementos. Nessa perspectiva, o eu não é negado em absoluto desde o início do caminho, mas aprende-se a usa-lo de forma hábil como um meio de abandoná-lo. (shrink)

By Belief Revision it is understood a system that logically explains the rational process of changing beliefs by taking into account a new piece of information. The most influential approach in this field of study, the AGM system, proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, postulates rationality criteria for different types of belief change. In this paper I shall assess the relationship between those criteria and argue for an opposition between the principles of Information Economy and Consistency. Furthermore, I shall argue (...) that Paraconsistent Belief Revision manages to minimise this friction in the best possible way. (shrink)

Os autores estudam um caso de linchamento ocorrido na cidade de Guarujá. Formulam sua hipótese a partir da teoria mimética de René Girard, demonstrando, no caso concreto, a presença de sinais vitimários que tornam um indivíduo suscetível a ser tomado como bode expiatório de uma comunidade em crise. Problematizam sobre a questão da mentalidade persecutória, justiça comunitária e sistema judiciário.

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

Revision operation is the consistent expansion of a theory by a new belief-representing sentence. We consider that in a paraconsistent setting this desideratum can be accomplished in at least three distinct ways: the output of a revision operation should be either non-trivial or non-contradictory (in general or relative to the new belief). In this paper those distinctions will be explored in the constructive level by showing how the remainder sets could be refined, capturing the key concepts of paraconsistency in a (...) dynamical scenario. These are preliminaries results of a wider project on Paraconsistent Belief Change conduced by the authors. (shrink)

"Paraconsistent Belief Revision Based on a Formal Consistency Operator" delves into Belief Revision—a significant area of research in Formal Philosophy that uses logic to model the ways in which human and artificial agents modify their beliefs in response to new information and examines how these changes can be considered rational. -/- Originally authored as a PhD thesis (previously published in Portuguese), this work provides a novel epistemic interpretation of Paraconsistency through Paraconsistent Belief Revision systems. It explores the concept of paraconsistency (...) from the standpoint of epistemic attitudes of acceptance and rejection. -/- This work challenges the traditional notion that accepting a new belief requires retracting its negation from the current epistemic state. The author contends that such reflexive retraction goes against the principle of informational economy, which is a crucial aspect of rationality in the context of belief change. Consequently, the phenomenon of paraconsistency is further examined from this fresh perspective of belief change, shedding light on the complexities of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). These LFIs provide the foundational logic, offering a comprehensive framework for understanding and implementing paraconsistent principles within belief revision systems. -/- This thesis was supervised by Marcelo Esteban Coniglio and co-supervised by Márcio Moretto Ribeiro, as part of Rafael Rodrigues Testa's doctoral studies at the University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil. (shrink)

*Winner of the American Philosophical Association's 2020 Essay Prize in Latin American Thought* This essay offers a novel account of the secularity of Latin American liberation philosophy. It challenges the accepted notion that liberation philosophy applies the methods and approaches of Latin American liberation theology to the philosophical arena, thus putting liberation theology on secular grounds. While this formulation is true insofar as liberation philosophy is not bound by the hermeneutics of any particular religious tradition, this formulation could be misconstrued (...) given that liberation philosophy does not premise such secularization in an undialectical understanding of secularity as secularism that disavows religion. Rather, liberation philosophy’s secularity is dialectical in that it requires constant engagement with re-ligion, not in the hermeneutics of any specific tradition but with “the traditional question of the Absolute.” Due to this often-misunderstood element of liberation philosophy, it has frequently been “ghettoized and relegated to the ‘safe’ area of theological studies,” as Eduardo Mendieta argues. However, I contend that liberation philosophy’s secular grounds offer an original contribution to philosophy as a decolonial and postsecularist liberation philosophy, one that conceives of secularism as an aspect of coloniality to be overcome, an obstacle rather than a benefit for Latin American philosophers seeking to gain a better understanding of our historical conditions. (shrink)

Este artigo investiga alguns usos da metáfora da linguagem como cálculo em Wittgenstein. A metáfora do cálculo emerge, nos anos 30, numa interlocução com o referencialista, e é ali instrumental na recondução do olhar filosófico para os usos efetivos do simbolismo linguístico. Contudo, foi levada longe demais, ao sugerir uma imagem da linguagem composta apenas de inferências à maneira dos sistemas de regras fechados. Isto embargaria certa expansão pragmática do contexto criterial da análise conceitual. Mas a aplicabilidade do símile do (...) cálculo não é invalidada. A metáfora será reativada em manuscritos posteriores, sempre e quando puder servir aos mesmos propósitos do período intermediário, à medida que o ambiente dialógico convoque novas vozes dogmaticamente referencialistas. Ainda assim, é nos manuscritos intermediários que melhor se esclarece o seu funcionamento. Tal movimento exemplifica, por fim, um método filosófico que não procede por meio da superação de problemas à maneira científica. (shrink)

This essay aims to provide conceptual tools for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s theory of color as a grammar problem instead of a phenomenological or purely scientific one. From an introduction of his understanding of meaning in his early and late life, his notion of grammar will be analyzed to understand his rebuttal of scientific and phenomenological discourse as a proper means for dealing with the problem of color through his critique of Goethe. Then Wittgenstein’s take on color will become clear (...) as his sympathy for Runge, the painter that Goethe criticizes, is analyzed to understand color as a language-game regarding kinds of colors as numbers and geometrical figures, in that grammar rather than experience is used to acknowledge them. (shrink)

This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images but (...) that “consistency should suffice for truth” (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo. (shrink)

Na década de 1980, um programa de pesquisa se popularizou no campo da filosofia e psicologia das emoções. Esse programa, denominado construcionismo social, afirmava que emoções eram produtos de fatores sociais e não poderiam ser compreendidas em um vocabulário adaptacionista. No entanto, ao longo do tempo essas teorias perderam grande parte de sua força e popularidade, e praticamente desapareceram da filosofia das emoções contemporânea. O objetivo do presente artigo será diagnosticar esse predicamento, e perguntar se o construcionismo social ainda poderia (...) ser uma via teórica interessante para o estudo das emoções. Para isso, iremos clarificar o significado da metáfora da “construção” e examinar algumas das principais teorias construcionistas de emoções. Embora nossas conclusões sejam negativas em relação ao rótulo da construção social, elas podem ainda assim trazer algum alívio para aqueles que se simpatizam com suas pretensões teóricas, prescrições metodológicas e foco de análise. (shrink)

Hegel insists that the category ‘nature’, expressed in relation to the ideal of aesthetic beauty, is not nature as such but a supplementary deviation coloured by the subjective position from which this ‘nature’ is posited. We cannot distinguish nature ‘in itself’ from the ideological-artistic conditions of the distorted ‘use’ of nature. Nature exists to us only by reference to what is subjectively treated as non-natural. A similar relation is posited by Lacan in his famous assertion that ‘there is no sexual (...) relation’. For Freud and Lacan, the ‘all too human’ sexual drive derives from a deviated/distorted enjoyment of the initial failure to enjoy a purely natural sexual relation: an inevitably castrated enjoyment, where ‘natural’ sexuality is revealed as impossible. In other words, sexuality is for Lacan and Freud its own distortion of the category of ‘natural’. Sexuality is a perpetually distorted and abnormal form of enjoyment, for which the alternative is not ‘normal/natural enjoyment’, but rather the negative state of a fundamental lack of any relation. Through Hegel and sexuality, this paper argues that the unavoidable misuse of nature is not caused by improper application/categorisation, but instead reflects an internal incompleteness or indeterminacy in nature as a category. (shrink)

We articulate a distinction between ontology, understood as involving existence questions, and metaphysics, understood as either providing for metaphysical profiles of entities or else as dealing with fundamentality and/or grounding and dependence questions. The distinction, we argue, allows a better understanding of the roles of metaontology and metametaphysics when it comes to discussing the relations between ontology and science on the one hand, and metaphysics and science on the other. We argue that while ontology, as understood in this paper, may (...) have reasonable perspectives for naturalization, given its relation to science, the same cannot be said for metaphysics, given that it is typically understood as an additional theoretical layer over science, not participating in the scientific investigation. That may result either in skepticism over metaphysics, or else on accepting that metaphysics is an autonomous branch of investigation, depending on one’s concern for metaphysics. (shrink)

Paraconsistency is the study of logical systems with a non-explosive negation such that a pair of contradictory formulas (with respect to such negation) does not necessarily imply triviality, discordant to what would be expected by contemporary logical orthodoxy. From a purely logical point of view, the significance of paraconsistency relies on the meticulous distinction between the general notions of contradictoriness and triviality of a theory—respectively, the fact that a given theory proves a proposition and its negation, and the fact that (...) a given theory proves any proposition (in the language of its underlying logic). Aside from this simple rationale, the formal techniques and approaches that meet the latter definitional requirement are manifold. Furthermore, it is not solely the logical-mathematical properties of such systems that are open to debate. Rather, there are several foundational and philosophical questions worth studying, including the very question about the nature of the contradictions allowed by paraconsistentists. This entry aims to advance a brief account of some distinct approaches to paraconsistency, providing a panorama on the development of paraconsistent logic. (shrink)

This article considers the historical tension in conceptualising Marx's materialism (dialectical and historical) as either a break from, or a fidelity to, Hegelian dialectics, and the methods by which this tension is itself subsumed under an insistence on vindicating the radical irreducibility of Marxist thought. Ultimately, however, it is argued that the question of whether Marx should or should not be framed alongside Hegel is the wrong question. It is not a question of 'Marx by himself' or 'Marx and... [Hegel]', (...) but rather of 'Marx without himself': as with any radical event in the history of ideas, it is a benefit to Marx's innovativeness that he can be retrospectively articulated according to historical traditions whilst simultaneously breaking from them. -/- . (shrink)

Resumo -/- A partir da experiência de produção de uma videoaula de Lógica em Libras (Testa, Moraes, Bizio e Caló, 2021) para o IFSP FILOLIBRAS, inserida no contexto do projeto ‘O Ensino de Filosofia para Surdos: elaboração de material didático em uma perspectiva de inclusão escolar’ (Moraes e Bizio, 2021), levantamos algumas questões relativas ao arcabouço teórico do projeto. Após introduzirmos as motivações do projeto, explicamos como sua metodologia foi tratada no contexto da aula de Lógica, expondo as principais dificuldades (...) e soluções encontradas. Através da análise desta experiência, pretendemos levantar subsídios teóricos para pesquisas futuras no tema, incluindo a produção de um curso inteiramente voltado para o ensino de Lógica em Libras, não apenas enquanto área da Filosofia, mas também enquanto área de estudo multi e transdisciplinar, propedêutica ao fomento do Pensamento Crítico. -/- Palavras-chave: Ensino de Lógica, Educação Especial, Pedagogia Bilíngue, Libras. -/- Abstract -/- Based on the experience of producing a video lesson on Logic in Libras (Testa, Moraes, Bizio and Caló, 2021) to the IFSP FILOLIBRAS, inserted in the context of the project ‘O Ensino de Filosofia para Surdos: elaboração de material didático em uma perspectiva de inclusão escolar’ (‘Teaching Philosophy for Deaf students: elaboration of didactic material in a perspective of inclusive education’, in a free translation) (Moraes and Bizio, 2021), we raise some questions regarding the theoretical framework of the project. After introducing the motivations of the project, we explain how the chosen methodology was considered in the context of the Logic class, exposing the main difficulties and solutions found. Through the analysis of this experience, we intend to raise theoretical subsidies for future research on the subject, including the production of a course entirely focused on the teaching of Logic in Libras, not only as an area of Philosophy but also as a multi and transdisciplinary area of study, propaedeutic to fostering Critical Thinking. -/- Keywords: Teaching Logic, Special Education, Bilingual Pedagogy, Libras. (shrink)

Rastrearemos a refutação da necessidade de fundamentos ontológicos para teorias éticas de Putnam analisando sua trajetória por autores como Quine, Moore e Wittgenstein. Partiremos do naturalismo epistemológico de Quine para estabelecer sua base coerentista pragmática. Então, investigaremos seu distanciamento da ontologia conforme sua perspectiva wittgensteiniana do conceitualismo mooreano e platônico. Caracterizando Heidegger como alvo primário de sua crítica a uma necessidade de ontologia, afasta-se mesmo de Quine ao abraçar uma relatividade conceitual inspirada na mereologia e em jogos de linguagem para (...) estabelecer a objetividade da ética sem a necessidade de objetos. Por fim, a partir dessa definição, investigaremos a concepção de ética segundo Putnam, fortemente inspirada em Dewey e Aristóteles em diálogo com Levinas e Kant em prol de um “florescimento cognitivo humano”. Sua definição é breve e superficial, todavia clama que tais características sejam necessárias a fim de dar maleabilidade à ética, em contraponto a uma definição rígida e facilmente quebradiça tendo em vista o amplo descordo presente na filosofia moral. Esta flexibilidade não cairia em relativismo absoluto uma vez que preza a razoabilidade e progresso, assim como evitaria doutrinas danosas “anti-florescimento”. (shrink)

Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not aligned with his (...) best evaluative judgement. Yet, if the agent’s best evaluative judgement provides him a reason for action, this reason should also be his strongest reason, and therefore, the strongest cause. How then can it be possible that an agent incontinently acts according to a reason of inferior causal strength? In this paper, I analyze how Davidson’s argument for the possibility of incontinent actions interacts with his causal theory of actions. I argue that Davidson’s proposal does not fully respect the two principles of intentional rationality, that he himself claims to be compelling. Lastly, I sketch some initial steps that might be helpful to drawing more precise conceptual distinctions in terms of the rationality of incontinent actions. (shrink)

Neste artigo fazemos uma discussão conceitual acerca da ferramenta de escolha por nós apresentada no trabalho “Solving Normative Conflicts using Preference Relations”, isto é, explicitamos a racionalidade subjacente a tal ferramenta, bem como as consequências práticas de sua aceitação.

The debate over Plato’s “ so called unwritten doctrines”, which he communicated only to a small circle of trusted disciples, has caused a stir among philosophers in recent decades. Rafael Ferber assumes a differentiated position in this controversy. He is convinced that the unwritten doctrines did exist, but that Plato, for reasons inherent in the process of gaining knowledge, was unable to communicate these doctrines even to his closest disciples. In this book, Ferber outlines the discussion and summarizes the (...) standpoints of greatest interest. Ever since Aristotle, we have known that Plato did not put his most important teachings into writing, but instead communicated them only orally to the inner circle of his disciples. While the extant dialogues merely pass down Plato’s “exoteric” doctrines, his most important “esoteric” insights were not meant for the general public. In the meantime, the contents and the significance of Plato’s “unwritten doctrines” have become the subject of debate in philosophical circles. Fifteen years ago, at the height of the controversy over the “unwritten doctrines”, Rafael Ferber entered the fray with a small book. He proposed that Plato was also unable to communicate the “unwritten doctrines” because the highest principles (i.e. the subject of the unwritten doctrines) cannot be known through logical operations due to an epistemological paradox. Ferber’s differentiated position met with great respect and acceptance, although in individual cases it was also rejected. Ferber’s new book again presents the text of 1991, but significantly expands on it through new perspectives and an outline of the discussion it triggered. In this book, the reader learns what is meant by Plato’s unwritten doctrines and what the controversy is all about. (shrink)

In The moral problem (1994), Michael Smith tries to link three conflicting theories that alone are intuitively plausible, nevertheless, they do not seem to work well together. The first proposes that moral judgments are in fact beliefs about objective matters. The second states the concept of “practicality requirement”. The third is a humean belief-desire psychology, i.e. if a moral judgment is sufficient to explain actions, then it must involve a desire. If that is the case, it cannot be simply a (...) belief. For Smith, any attempt to solve the moral problem must find a way to hold all three doctrines. I will argue that his solution rests on two false assumptions. The first, a rationalist one which supports that what we have reason to do is what we would desire to do if we were fully rational. The second is the internalist thesis about moral motivation according to which a person who believes she is morally required to do something is either necessarily motivated to do it or she is practically irrational. I will base my critics on four objections raised by Copp, Miller, Shafer-Landau, Brink and Sayre-McCord. (shrink)

La questione sulla verità del cristianesimo è fondamentale e ineludibile. In essa si trova uno dei filoni fondamentali del pensiero di Joseph Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI. In fondo si trovano coinvolti una serie di argomenti che si possono riassumere nel rapporto tra fede e ragione, tra il Dio della fede e il Dio dei filosofi. Nella visione cristiana ambedue non si contrappongono, ma s’incontrano. La “distinzione mosaica” s’incontra con la “distinzione socratica” . La pretesa di verità del cristianesimo conduce a (...) delle conseguenze sia nell’ambito della religione, sia in quello della filosofia e della morale. Per superare la crisi del cristianesimo abbiamo bisogno di recuperare la fiducia nela ragione e tornare alla ricerca della verità. (shrink)

One core question in contemporary political economy is whether economic liberties should be constitutionally protected as basic rights. In this article I do not provide a positive argument for the view that economic liberties are basic rights. Rather, I seek to provide a reason for not embracing the opposing view, i.e. that economic liberties should not be constitutionally protected as basic rights. Based on Hayek’s theory of price as signal, I argue that price control, a view usually associated with high (...) liberals, and sometimes endorsed by moderate welfarists, is environmentally sub-optimal. (shrink)

Autogestão, autoempreendedorismo, infotrabalho, trabalho intermitente, criptomoeda, uberização, proletariado de serviços e servidão digital delineiam uma série de designações indicativas das mudanças das condições de (re)produção do Capital nas suas formas contemporâneas. Grandes corporações como Google, Facebook e Amazon participam desse processo tanto no eixo da infraestrutura econômica, quanto na produção discursiva que sustenta ideologicamente as relações de trabalho determinadas pelo Aparelho Digital. Essa pesquisa elege como material específico de análise uma sequência de cursos oferecidos pelo “YouTube Academy” para a criação, (...) gerenciamento e divulgação de uma empresa associada à plataforma de vídeos do YouTube. O objetivo é investigar os modos de imbricação e/ou separação entre o sujeito e a empresa. Para construir os procedimentos analíticos, delimitamos as seguintes perguntas: Como as formas imaginárias do sujeito (o “eu”, a identidade e a individualidade) estão relacionadas com a criação e o funcionamento de uma empresa no YouTube? Como o trabalho e as relações de trabalho são significados nessa discursividade? O olhar discursivo é ainda guiado por compreensões de pesquisas anteriores: o modo como o “eu” é discursivizado em produto, o funcionamento da “empresa de si” como modelo de identificação e a empresarialidade. As referências passam por Michel Pêcheux, Eni Orlandi, Suzy Lagazzi, Luciana Nogueira, Guilherme Adorno, Joel Bombardelli, Pierre Dardot, Christian Laval e Ricardo Antunes. O conceito de político, compreendido discursivamente como conflito e disputa pelos sentidos - e seus efeitos de deslocamento, assim como o apagamento do político do lugar que lhe seria próprio - e o conceito de exterioridade discursiva são mais enfaticamente mobilizados na pesquisa, além das discussões em torno do discurso neoliberal e da psicologização do sujeito pelos efeitos discursivos de liberdade e autonomia. Um trabalho de análise da constituição da discursividade que tem o “sentido (já) lá” como resultado do efeito de exterioridade. Esperamos mostrar, assim, como, nas condições de produção sócio-históricas de um “Imperialismo Digital”, uma mudança da “economia política do poder-dizer” afeta os modos de circulação não só dos discursos, mas do próprio Capital. (shrink)

La finalidad del presente artículo es descubrir la presencia del concepto de persona en la doctrina de la soberanía de Carl Schmitt. A pesar de que este concepto tuvo un amplio desarrollo metafísico en el seno del pensamiento cristiano durante la antigüedad tardía, jamás pudo desembarazarse de la impronta jurídica de sus creadores los juristas romanos. Por tal razón, sirvió como soporte conceptual para el posterior despliegue de la noción de persona jurídica, sistematizada a lo largo de la modernidad. Para (...) lograr nuestro objetivo, intentaremos rastrear la transformación del concepto de persona a lo largo de la edad media y la modernidad, así como revisar el concepto de soberanía en la teoría política moderna. Por otro lado, estudiaremos la noción de decisión en la obra de Carl Schmitt, noción que el gran jurista alemán utilizó para definir su propia concepción de la soberanía. A partir de estas precisiones, intentaremos establecer la relación existente entre la noción de persona y la de decisión en el seno de la concepción schmittiana de la soberanía tomando como hilo conductor los presupuestos teológicos implícitos en ella. Como veremos, tales presupuestos nos remitirán a la obra del pensador danés Søren Kierkegaard, cuyas doctrinas nos mostrarán todo el alcance del planteamiento schmittiano. De esta manera, podemos concluir que el concepto de persona subyacente al decisionismo schmittiano ha sido transformado, en primer término, en el de existencia política, noción determinada por la relación de enemistad; y, en segundo lugar, en el de unidad de la personalidad, concepto determinado por la actualización de la dimensión espiritual al interior de la condición humana. (shrink)

The article tries to prove that the famous formula "epekeina tês ousias" has to be understood in the sense of being beyond being and not only in the sense of being beyond essence. We make hereby three points: first, since pure textual exegesis of 509b8–10 seems to lead to endless controversy, a formal proof for the metaontological interpretation could be helpful to settle the issue; we try to give such a proof. Second, we offer a corollary of the formal proof, (...) showing that not only self-predication of the form of the Good, but of any form is not possible, that is: no form of F has the form of F. Third, we apply Spinoza’s distinction between an ens imaginarium and a chimaera to Plato’s Idea of the Good. (shrink)

The paper proposes (1.) a non-standard interpretation of the proverbial expression “deuteros plous” by giving a fresh look to Phaedo, 99c9-d1. Then (2.) it proceeds to the philosophical problem raised in this passage according to this interpretation, that is, the problem of the “hypothesis” or the “unproved principle”. It indicates finally (3.) the kernel of truth contained in the standard Interpretation and it concludes with some remarks on the “weakness of the logoi”.

In the whole Corpus Platonicum, we find in principle only one "direct argument" (Charles Kahn) for the existence of the ideas (Tim.51d3-51e6). The purpose of the article is to analyse this argument and to answer the question of why Plato in the Timaeus again defended the existence of the ideas despite the objections in the Parmenides. He defended it again because the latent presupposition of the apories in the Parmenides, the substantial view of sensibles, is removed through the introduction of (...) space as "substantialized extension". First (I) it is shown that Plato remained in dialogues, like the Sophist and Politicus, faithful to the "theory of ideas" despite his criticism in the Parmenides. The common theme in the trilogy of the Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus is to refute relativism by showing that any relativism presupposes something absolute that is something like the "theory of ideas". The second part of the paper (II) examines closely the logical structure of the argument for the existence of ideas in the Timaeus (51d3-52a7). The third part (III) shows how this argument can avoid the criticism of ideas in the Parmenides. In the Parmenides, sensibles are treated as substantial entities. But, as the Timaeus shows, sensibles are not substantial entities but merely qualities, namely qualities of space, which is the only substance in the sensible world. A shortened English version of the paper appeared in Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum, Granada, Selected papers, ed. by T. Calvo/L. Brisson, Academia Verlag, St. Augustin, 1997, 179-186. -/- But the only "direct argument" (Tim.51d3-51e6) seems to be interestingly flawed. Cf. Ferber, Rafael; Hiltbrunner, Thomas, (2005). (shrink)

Nosso objetivo neste trabalho é apresentar uma proposta de solução a paradoxos relacionados à lógica deôntica presentes na literatura, reunidos sob o que é chamado de dilemas deônticos - situações nas quais duas obrigações conflitantes estão presentes num mesmo sistema normativo. Situações deste tipo, quando formalizadas (em SDL - standard deontic logic - ou em outras lógicas relacionadas), levam a uma inconsistência. Nossa proposta baseia-se em relações de preferência que geram uma ferramenta de escolha dentre as duas soluções normativas conflitantes, (...) o que evita a inconsistência e permite o pleno cumprimento do sistema. Justificativas filosóficas são fornecidas as ferramentas lógicas, bem como as suas implicações. (shrink)

O propósito deste trabalho é analisar a estrutura e discutir a aplicação da(s) lógica(s) deôntica(s) na representação de normas jurídicas. Após uma apresentação desta(s) lógic(s) e, em particular, do sistema de von Wright e da SDL (Standard Deontic Logic), veremos as dificuldades de se aplicar uma lógica à análise do direito positivo: as regras da lógica devem permitir realizar sobre as normas formalizadas somente os tipos de inferência e operaçôes lógicas intuitivamente feitas pelos juristas, ou seja, a reconstrução lógica do (...) direito positivo não se trata de uma tarefa de criação do direito, mas uma tarefa de representação daquilo que o conceito de direito usual reconhece como tal. Para ilustrar estas dificuldades, abordaremos as propostas de Carlos Alchourrón em artigo de 1975, “Condicionalidad y la representación de las normas jurídicas”. (shrink)